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CIA/RR GP 60-48:L

(Part 2)

14 April 1960

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director/Intelligence

**THROUGH:** Assistant Director, Research and Reports

**SUBJECT:** Additional Comments on the Report on Antarctica  
and the OCB Operations Plan for Antarctica

**I. The State proposal to delete para. 2 in the Operations Plan**

**A. Background.** The unexpected position demanded by Assistant Secretary of State Wilcox stems from the China desk in State (Miss Bacon). The objection is based on the grounds that:

1. The stated objectives quoted from NSC 5905/1 are too broad and might convey benefits to unrecognized communist regimes, specifically China;
2. These NSC objectives were modified during the Antarctic Treaty negotiations when, at the insistence of the China desk, Harter decided that accession to the Treaty was to be limited so as to exclude all non-recognized regimes [at the time the Chinese were planning to join the Soviets in the Antarctic]. The negotiated formula now limits accession to members of UN and other States unanimously acceptable to signatories. The latter method was a compromise with the Soviets. Thus it not only serves to exclude the CHICOMS and East Germans, but West Germans as well.

**B. Arguments for:** The move to delete para. 2, as argued by some of the State proponents, is logical because

1. the treaty has overtaken the policy by the formula which no longer makes access to the Antarctic Treaty available to all countries;
2. the discordance between the older policy and the new treaty may confuse US missions who may receive the Operations Plan but do not have access to the NSC paper. This could lead to confusion in interpreting US objectives to foreigners by US missions.

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**C. Arguments against deletion:**

1. The Antarctic Staff opposes the deletion just as it opposed the dictum within the US delegation at the treaty negotiations [privileged information]. The Staff feels that it solves nothing and only injected the one basic contentious point with the Soviets. Accession to the Treaty is not prerequisite to undertaking activity in Antarctica. Thus the CHICOM or East Germans (there are two of the latter with the Soviets in Antarctica now) can operate freely in Antarctica and, not being signatories to the Treaty, are not subject to its provisions. Moreover, the non-recognized regimes could become members of SCAR creating a dichotomous situation between Treaty signatories and SCAR membership. [To control this problem, State is seeking a complete separation between the Treaty and SCAR].
2. The scientists oppose this back-door modification of policy. During Treaty negotiations NSP took the matter to the President thru Dr. Kistiakovsky. It is reported that the President strongly opposed any change in these objectives. If true, we have a delicate situation at Cabinet-NSC level. The fact is that the policy has been modified, but not in an objective, aerial manner. NSP is very concerned over this maneuver.
3. If the exclusion of non-recognized regimes ever changes into an open issue, the US would be open to possible fruitful accusation of duplicity by the communists, since the President's announcement of May 2, 1956 stressed that research in Antarctica would be open to all countries.

**D. Recommended action:**

1. Discourage any move which would lead to an NSC policy exercise that could involve the explosive question of CHICOM recognition at this time. The controversy could become so involved that it could delay adoption of the Operations Plan without any significant benefit to the problem, namely, that the US cannot, by force or persuasion, exclude the unrecognized regimes from research activity in the Antarctic.

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2. Subject to the above considerations, support retention of the objectives.

**II. Omission in the Draft Report and Operations Plan**

- A. Omission of USIA contributions. Inadvertently, one basic omission has resulted in both documents. The Draft Report fails to summarize USIA activities undertaken during the period covered. The Operations Plan has no statement of objectives and guidance for USIA activities.
- B. Recommended Action. Raise the question of the omission. In view of the circumspect but aggressive Soviet international radio propaganda effort, it would be useful to have USIA focus on a program adequately publicizing US activities and accomplishments.
  1. It would not be necessary to force a delay of the approval of the Plan at this time. A USIA program would benefit from a special consideration by the Working Group, since the subject is so different from the science-support portion of US operations. Thus a later supplement could be prepared and considered without delay in the entire Plan.

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CIA Member, Working Group on  
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